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Inheritances create a second distinguishing characteristic of individuals, in 
addition to earning abilities. We incorporate this fact into an optimum income 
taxation model with bequests motivated by joy of giving, and show that a tax on 
inherited wealth is equivalent to a uniform tax on consumption plus bequests. 
These taxes are desirable according to an intertemporal social objective if, on 
average, high-able individuals inherit more wealth than low-able. We 
demonstrate that such a situation results as the outcome of a process with 
stochastic transition of abilities over generations, if all descendants are more 
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1. Introduction 
The tax on estate or inheritance has been a highly controversial issue for long.
1 On the 
political level, opponents consider it morally inappropriate to use the moment of death as a 
cause for imposing a tax, and stress its negative economic consequences, in particular on 
capital accumulation and on family business. Supporters find these consequences 
exaggerated and claim that a tax on bequests is desirable for redistributive reasons, 
contributing to "equality of opportunity". 
 
In the academic literature, no widely accepted view on this tax seems to have evolved 
either. One reason for this may be that there is too little empirical knowledge of the 
magnitude of its effect on the economy. Another reason is that also on the theoretical level 
the consequences of inheritance taxation on efficiency and equity have not been worked out 
clearly. Indeed, we argue that studies in optimum tax theory, which provides the 
appropriate framework for such an analysis, have not yet succeeded in clarifying the role of 
this tax within the entire tax system.  
 
The intention of this paper is to propose an optimum-taxation model, which allows a 
discussion of the central question: is a shift from labor income taxation to a tax on 
intergenerational wealth transfers a desirable means of redistribution? To answer this 
question, we extend the standard optimum income taxation approach in the tradition of 
Mirrlees (1971) to a sequence of generations and introduce a bequest motive. As the 
adequate version of the bequest motive we consider bequests as consumption (or joy-of 
                                                  
1   Specifically in the USA, there has been a heated debate on the proposal to repeal the federal estate tax 
permanently. In 2006 it failed the required majority narrowly in the Senate, after the House of 
Representatives had voted overwhelmingly for the permanent repeal. Some countries like Sweden and 
Singapore have just recently abolished taxation of inherited wealth, or, like Austria, phase out this tax. 
However, many other countries, in particular in Europe, still stick to their taxes on inheritance.    2
giving, see, e.g., Cremer and Pestieau 2006): the amount left to the descendants has a 
positive effect on the parents’ utility similar to the consumption of a good.
2 Individuals 
differ in their earning abilities, inherited wealth increases their budget on top of their labor 
income; and they use their budget for consumption and bequests left to the next generation. 
 
The essential point of our analysis is the following: inherited wealth creates a second 
distinguishing characteristic of individuals, in addition to earning abilities, and it is this fact 
which motivates the view that a tax on estates or inheritances enhances equality of 
opportunity. Therefore, the relevant task is to derive optimum-taxation results in a model 
which allows a simultaneous consideration of both the intragenerational heterogeneity in 
abilities and the dynamics of inequality arising from intergenerational wealth transfers. We 
formulate such a model which allows us to find new insights into the implications of 
inheritance taxation, in particular, how the welfare of different generations is affected. 
 
Surprisingly, former contributions discussing bequest taxation in an optimum-taxation 
framework have not incorporated this point appropriately. Instead of concentrating on the 
differences caused by bequests within the generation of heirs, authors focus on the 
bequeathing generation and ask for the specifics of leaving bequests, as compared to other 
ways of spending the budget, that is, consumption of goods. Such an analysis, referring to a 
standard result in optimum-taxation theory (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1972, among others), 
leads to the question of whether preferences are separable between leisure and consumption 
plus bequests – then an income tax alone suffices, spending need not be taxed at all –, or 
                                                  
2   Another motive would be pure altruism, where the parents' utility function has utility of the descendants as 
an argument. This motive leads to dynastic preferences. We do not intend to model redistribution between 
dynasties, but between individuals in each generation. We also leave out the strategic bequest motive as 
well as unintended bequests (for the latter, see Blumkin and Sadka 2003; they study estate taxation also in 
case of dynastic preferences).   3
whether leaving bequests represents a complement or a substitute to enjoying leisure.
3 We 
argue in the present paper that this is the inappropriate question, because the Atkinson-
Stiglitz result is derived for a model where individuals only differ in earning abilities. What 
matters is not that bequests represent a particular use of the budget, but the fact that they 
transmit inequality across generations. 
 
On the other hand, there are some papers which do pay attention to the fact that inheritances 
create a second distinguishing characteristic, in addition to earning abilities. However, to 
our knowledge this literature does not provide a unified framework for an analysis of the 
role of bequest taxation within an optimum tax system. Cremer et al. (2001) resume the 
discussion of indirect taxes, given that individuals differ in endowments (inheritances) as 
well as abilities and that an optimum nonlinear tax on labor income is imposed. They 
assume, however, that inheritances are unobservable and concentrate on the structure of 
indirect tax rates. Similarly, Cremer et al. (2003) and Boadway et al. (2000) study the 
desirability of a tax on capital income as a surrogate for the taxation of inheritances, which 
are considered unobservable.  
 
In contrast to these contributions, we study a comprehensive tax system where a nonlinear 
tax on labor income can be combined with taxes on inherited wealth and on expenditures. 
Therefore, we take all these variables as being observable (only abilities are unobservable). 
This is indeed the basis upon which real-world tax systems, including the tax on bequests, 
operate. In particular, if we want to know whether the inheritance tax should be retained or 
abolished from a welfare-theoretic point of view, the analysis must be based on the 
assumption of observable initial wealth.  
                                                  
3   See Gale and Slemrod (2001, p.33) and Kaplow (2001), as well as Blumkin and Sadka (2003) in the 
context of a dynastic model.   4
 
As a starting point we consider a static model with two types of individuals, who live for 
one period and hold exogenously given initial wealth, which together with labor income is 
used for the consumption of two goods. We discuss two tax systems: (i) an optimum tax on 
labor income combined with a proportional (direct) tax on initial wealth, and (ii) an 
optimum tax on labor income combined with a proportional (indirect) tax on all 
consumption expenditures. We show that these two tax systems are equivalent and, 
moreover, that a tax on initial wealth or on consumption expenditures is desirable according 
to a utilitarian objective, if initial wealth increases with earning abilities. The underlying 
reason is that introducing these taxes allows further redistribution on top of what can be 
achieved through labor income taxation alone. Note that the wealth tax is lump-sum while 
the expenditure tax is not, but the distorting effect of the latter on labor supply can be offset 
by an adaptation of the labor income tax. 
 
Then we turn to an analysis of the dynamic model, for which we choose the most 
parsimonious version appropriate for our purpose: there is a sequence of generations, where 
again each lives for one period. One of the consumption goods is now interpreted as 
bequests, which become the initial (= inherited) wealth of the following generation.
4 When 
discussing the two equivalent ways of imposing a tax (either directly on inherited wealth or 
indirectly on expenditures, i.e. on consumption plus bequests), we now take into account 
that bequests left by some generation influence the welfare of future generations. It turns 
out, contrary to what one expects, that introducing dynamic effects does not change 
anything compared to the result of the static model: that inherited wealth increases with 
                                                  
4   We assume that bequests are not productive but represent immediate consumption possibilities for the next 
generation. As individuals live for one period only, there is no other saving except for the purpose of 
leaving bequests, and a tax on wealth transfer is equivalent to a tax on capital income. Hence we need not 
introduce the latter.   5
earning abilities remains the only decisive criterion for both ways of taxation. All other 
welfare effects – including those falling on later generations – associated with the 
introduction of the tax on inherited wealth (or on consumption plus bequests), are 
neutralized by the simultaneous adaptation of the optimum tax on labor income. Thus, we 
also find that the “double-counting” problem, which typically arises in models where 
bequests enter a social objective twice
5, does not occur in our framework. 
 
This result has to be modified somewhat if the first instrument (a tax directly imposed on 
inherited wealth) is applied and if one assumes that the bequeathing individuals care for 
bequests net of the inheritance tax falling on the heirs. Then collecting the tax in some 
period will have repercussions on the bequest decision of the previous generation. This 
problem does not arise with an expenditure tax.  
 
In a next step, we generalize the model to one with arbitrarily many types of individuals 
and with a stochastic relation between inherited wealth and earning abilities. Restricting the 
analysis to quasilinear preferences, we show that the results remain essentially unchanged, 
the crucial point for the desirability of a tax on inherited wealth (or on consumption plus 
bequests) being that expected inheritances increase with abilities. Finally, we provide a 
theoretical argument demonstrating that this is indeed plausible: we analyze a stochastic 
process of abilities which is built on the key assumption that all descendants are more 
probable to have their parent’s ability rank than any other.
6 It turns out that if each parent 
                                                  
5    Bequeathing causes two positive effects on the involved individuals (the donor enjoys giving, the 
beneficiary likes receiving), and the welfare of both appears in the social welfare function. This calls for a 
subsidy instead of a tax on bequests. Some authors discuss “laundering out” this double counting from the 
social welfare function, see, e. g., Cremer and Pestieau (2006).  
6    This assumption is justified by various empirical studies which find that the children's incomes are 
positively correlated with those of their parents. For instance, Solon 1992 and Zimmerman 1992 both find 
an intergenerational correlation in income of 0.4 for the US economy.    6
has a descendant, to whom she leaves her bequests, this process indeed generates a 
distribution such that expected inheritances increase with abilities in any generation.
 7  
 
Our work is related to contributions which study a stochastic process describing the 
transition of wealth over generations, and analyze the evolution of inequality. They show 
that, depending on the assumptions of the model, a tax on bequests may increase inequality 
(by reducing the role of inheritances as compensating for income shocks of the 
descendants, see, e.g., Becker and Tomes 1979) or decrease inequality (by redistributing 
wealth, see, e.g., Bossmann, Kleiber and Wälde, 2007, Davies and Kuhn 1991). In contrast 
to these contributions, which concentrate on inequality measures, but do not discuss welfare 
effects and typically assume fixed labor supply, we follow the optimum-taxation approach, 
which allows a combined consideration of efficiency and redistributive effects of the 
taxation of bequests, and we analyze its role within the tax system. 
 
In the following Section 2 the model with two types of individuals is introduced and the 
results for the static as well as for the dynamic formulation are derived in turn. In Section 3 
the model is generalized to more types and a stochastic relation between ability levels and 
inheritances. Moreover, a transition process which generates such a stochastic relation is 
studied. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.  
 
                                                  
7   To our knowledge, there is no direct empirical evidence on this issue. However, it has been found that 
earnings are positively correlated with wealth (see, e.g., Díaz-Giménez et al. 2002 for the US economy, 
who find a positive correlation between earnings and wealth of 0.47). This can be seen as a partial support 
for our result, as wealth consists of inheritances to a substantial extent (for an overview see Kessler and 
Masson 1989).   7
2. Two ways of taxing inherited wealth 
We begin this Section with an analysis of a static model, which will be extended to a 
dynamic framework with many generations in Subsection 2.2. The economy consists of two 
individuals i = L, H, characterized by differing earning abilities  LH ω< ω, and by 
exogenous initial endowments of (inherited) wealth ei, i = L,H. The individuals live for one 
period. By supplying labor time li, each individual earns pre-tax income zi = ωili, i = L,H. 
After-tax income is denoted by xi, which, together with initial wealth, is spent on general 
consumption ci and some specific good bi. We call the latter good bequests to be consistent 
with the terminology later on, though – taken literally – it makes no sense to have bequests 
in a static model. The individuals have common preferences, described by the concave 
utility function u(c,b,l), which is twice differentiable, with  u/ c, u/ b 0 ∂ ∂∂ ∂>,  u/ l 0 ∂∂ < . 
 
2.1 A basic equivalence 
In our model, the tax system consists of a tax on labor income, described implicitly by the 
function σ: \ → \, which relates gross and net income: x = σ(z) (thus the tax is   z – σ(z)), 
of a proportional tax τe on initial wealth, and of proportional taxes τc and τb on consumption 
and bequests, resp. Assuming that the prices of consumption and bequests are one, the 
budget constraint of an individual i reads: 
 
  ci bi i ei (1 )c (1 )b (z ) (1 )e +τ + +τ ≤σ + −τ . (1) 
 
Obviously, τe is a lump-sum tax in this case.  
 
The budget set  ii c b e B( (z ),e , , , ) στ τ τ  contains all nonnegative pairs (ci,bi) which fulfill the 
budget constraint (1). If two tax systems lead to identical budget sets for any zi and any   8
given ei, then the two tax systems induce the same decisions of the individuals with respect 
to the choice of li, ci, bi. Therefore we call the two tax systems equivalent in this case.  
 
It is well known that in the absence of initial wealth a tax system consisting of an income 
tax plus a uniform expenditure tax is equivalent to an income tax alone. This is no longer 
true, if there exist wealth endowments: then there is a case for a second tax instrument, in 
addition to the tax on labor income. We find immediately: 
 
Lemma 1:  
(a)  A tax system  ecb ( ,,,) σ τττ  is equivalent to a tax system  ecb ˆˆ ˆ ˆ (, , , ) σ τττ , where one 
of  ecb ˆˆˆ (,,) τττ is zero. Moreover, 
 




























(b)    A tax system  ecb (, , , ) στ τ τ  with  cb τ =τ  is equivalent to a tax system 
ecb ˆˆ ˆ ˆ (, , , ) στ τ τ , where  cb ˆˆ τ= τ and either  e ˆ 0 τ =  or  cb ˆˆ0 τ =τ = . The formulas in (a) 
apply. 
 
Proof: follows immediately from appropriate manipulations of the budget constraint (1). 
 
In the following we make use of the observation, expressed in Lemma 1(b) that a tax on 
initial wealth is essentially the same as a uniform tax on expenditures for consumption and 
bequests (which in fact are a form of consumption), because the income tax can be adjusted   9
accordingly. In particular, the uniform expenditure tax represents a kind of lump-sum tax in 
this framework, as does the tax on initial wealth, though expenditures are variable, while 
wealth is fixed. 
 
Note that the switch to a tax system without a tax on initial wealth means that the income 
tax has to be reduced (net income σ(z) is increased), while the taxes on ci and bi have to be 
increased. Similarly, a switch such that expenditures are untaxed (consider case (b)) means 
an increase of the income tax and of the tax on initial wealth (if τe < 1). 
 
The equivalence extends to the welfare effect of a marginal change of the tax system, which 





iiie iii i v(x ,z,e, , ) max u(c,b,z / )| τ τ≡ ω } ii i e i (1 )(c b ) x (1 )e +τ + ≤ + −τ ,  
 
where we consider a tax system with a uniform tax rate τ on all expenditures, equivalent to 
the tax rate τe on initial wealth.  
 
As usual, we assume that the tax authority cannot tie a tax directly with individual abilities, 
because they are not observable, therefore it imposes an income tax as a second-best 
instrument. For the determination of the latter, we take some tax rate τ and/or τe as fixed for 
the moment. In case that there are no restrictions on the functional form of the income tax, 
the appropriate way to determine the optimum nonlinear schedule is to maximize a social 
welfare function with respect to the individuals' income bundles (x,z), subject to the self-
selection constraints and the resource constraints. 
   10
As is standard in optimum income taxation models, we assume that the condition of "agent 
monotonicity" (Mirrlees 1971, Seade 1982) holds. Define 
ii i
zx i i MRS ( v z ) ( v x ) ≡ −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , 




zx zx MRS MRS >  at any vector (x,z). 
 
As is well-known, this single-crossing condition guarantees that for any income tax 
function the high-able individual does not choose to earn less income than the low-able.
8  
 
We assume a utilitarian social welfare function with weights fL,fH, fL ≥ fH > 0, of the two 





LL L L e HH H H e x, z
maxf v (x ,z ,e , , ) f v (x ,z ,e , , ). ττ + ττ (2) 
 
The resource constraint reads 
 
  () ( ) LHLHe LH L L H H x x z z e e c ( )b ( )c ( )b ( ) g + ≤ + + τ + + τ ⋅+ ⋅+ ⋅+ ⋅ − , (3) 
 
where g denotes the resources required by the state.  i c() ⋅ ,  i b () ⋅  are demand functions with 
the same arguments as 
i v() ⋅ , i = L, H.  
 
Moreover, we have to introduce the self-selection constraints: the government must 
determine the two bundles of gross and net income in such a way that no individual prefers 
the bundle assigned to the other. We follow the frequently made assumption of a sufficient 
                                                  
8   It should be noted that in the presence of initial (non-human) endowments this assumption is more critical 
than in the standard model à la Mirrlees: if initial wealth of the high-able individual is sufficiently larger 
(thus, her marginal utility of income is sufficiently lower) than that of the low-able, the former might 
require a larger amount of net income as a compensation for her effort to earn one more unit of gross 
income, than what the latter requires (even though the high able needs less additional working time for 
this). Such a potential problem does not occur, if we work with quasilinear preferences, as we do in 
Section 3.   11
importance of the low-able individual in the objective function (2). Then the social 
objective favors redistribution from the high- to the low-able individual, and one can show 
that only the self-selection constraint of the high-able individual is binding in the optimum 




HHHe LLHe v( x, z, e, ,) v( x, z, e, ,) ττ ≥ ττ . (4) 
 
Let, for given  e τ ,τ, the optimum value of the social welfare function (2) subject to the 
constraints (3) and (4) be denoted by S( e τ ,τ), and let the Lagrange multiplier of the self-
selection constraint (4) be denoted by μ.  μ is positive as a consequence of the above 
assumption that (4) is binding in the optimum. We use the notation 
H
L v[ L ] /x 0 ∂∂ >  to 




























Hence,  ee S/ ( S / )(1 ) /(1 ) ∂∂ τ = ∂∂ τ − τ + τ  and both taxes increase social welfare, if the 
initial wealth of the high-able individual is larger than that of the low-able. 
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
                                                  
9   Mimicking refers to a situation where the high-able individual opts for the (x,z)-bundle designed for the 
low-able.   12
Given a larger wealth of the high-able individuals, the social objective calls for further 
redistribution than what is possible through an income tax alone. Such an additional 
redistribution can equivalently be achieved by a tax on initial wealth or on expenditures. In 
particular, it turns out that the justification for (uniform) indirect taxation is uniquely linked 
to the existence of differing wealth endowments: given these, the expenditure tax combined 
with an optimum income tax is indeed a lump-sum tax, being equivalent to the tax on initial 
wealth.  
 
The positive effect on welfare comes from a relaxation of the self-selection constraint 
induced by an increase of τe (or τ). The intuition can be explained as follows: assume, as a 
first step, that after an increase of τe by Δτe, each individual i is just compensated through 
an increase of net labor income xi by Δτeei. If eH > eL, the high-able individual experiences 
a larger increase of the net labor income than the less able which makes mimicking less 
attractive and gives slack to the self-selection constraint. As a consequence, in a second 
step additional redistribution from the high- to the low-able individuals becomes possible, 
which increases social welfare. In our model, this mechanism works as long as the social 
objective favors further redistribution; if the desired extent of redistribution via τe (or τ) is 
attained, the Lagrange multiplier μ becomes zero.  
 
One may object to our model that assuming a fixed relation between (unobservable) 
abilities and (observable) initial wealth (or expenditures) makes an income tax not a 
reasonable instrument from the beginning. Namely, the tax authority can use information 
on initial wealth (or on expenditures) to identify individuals, and then impose a tax on 
abilities directly, which is first-best. In reality, however, such a method of identification is 
not employed, and the main reason seems to be that initial wealth (or expenditures) is not a   13
precise indicator for earning abilities. By incorporating this idea in our model we will show 
in Section 3 that an accordingly modified version of Theorem 1 also holds when initial 
wealth is stochastic. 
 
2.2 Taxation of inheritances in a dynamic economy 
As a next step we formulate a simple intertemporal model within which we discuss the 
optimum taxation of inheritance. We assume that the (static) two-person economy 
described above represents the situation in some single period t, and we take into account 
that bequests (and taxes on them) affect the welfare of future generations. 
 
In view of the results of the foregoing Subsection, the ultimate reason, why the 
intergenerational transfer of wealth may represent an object for taxation is that receiving 
inheritances creates a second distinguishing characteristic of the individuals, in addition to 
their earning abilities. In order to account for this, two possible instruments can be applied 
(in some period t): 
 
−  taxing inherited wealth eit as a direct source of inequality within the receiving 
generation. That is, an inheritance tax τet is employed for generation t in our model.  
−  using a "full" expenditure tax (that is, in our terminology, a uniform tax τt on 
consumption cit plus bequests bit) as a surrogate taxation of unequal inherited wealth 
eit of the bequeathing generation t. 
 
In a static framework, these two instruments proved equivalent (and lump-sum). We now 
ask what can be said in an intertemporal setting, that is, when effects on future generations 
are taken into account. Let a series of arbitrary τes,τs, s ≥ t, be given (possibly zero). In   14
some period t, the government imposes an optimum income tax and considers a change of 
τet,τt. The revenues from τet,τt run into the budget of this generation t and are redistributed 
through a reduced need for labor-income tax revenues. 
 
Effects on future generations 
We work with the indirect utility functions as before, now being defined as  
 
  { }
i
t it it it et t it it it it t it it it et it v (x ,z ,e , , ) max u(c ,b ,z / )|( 1 )(c b ) x ( 1 )e ττ≡ ω + τ + ≤ +− τ .  
 
Inherited wealth eit of an individual i of generation t is exogenous. It arises as a result of 
some allocation of aggregate bequests bLt-1 + bHt-1 left by the previous generation to the 
individuals of generation t. For the analysis of this Section, the rules guiding this allocation 
need not be specified.  
 
On the other hand, the bequests  it b () ⋅  left by generation t represent initial wealth for the 
individuals of the next generation t+1 and enter their utility. Moreover, they also influence 
bequests left by generation t+1 and, by this, utility of generation t + 2, and so on. We take 
account of all these effects through a very general formulation: we simply assume that 
(discounted) welfare of all future generations from t+1 onwards can be described by some 
general (intertemporal) social welfare function W(bLt, bHt), which depends on the bequests 
left to generation t+1.
10 In order to determine the tax rates in period t, the planner must take 
care of how the tax rates influence future welfare, and this happens only via bequests of 
generation t in our model. Thus, W must be known to the planner, but it can be any suitable 
function.  
                                                  
10   As mentioned in the Introduction, we assume a zero rate of return. However, even if there were a positive 
rate of return on (bequeathed) capital, its welfare effect would be included in W, and our results would 
remain unchanged.    15
 
Then the objective function of the planner to determine the optimum nonlinear income tax 





it t it it it et t Lt Ht
iL , H x, z
max f v (x ,z ,e , , ) (1 ) W(b ( ),b ( ))
−
=
ττ++ γ ⋅ ⋅ ∑ , (5) 
 
where γ > 0 represents the planner's one-period discount rate. (5) is to be maximized subject 
to the resource constraint  
 
  () ( ) Lt Ht Lt Ht et Lt Ht t Lt Lt Ht Ht t xxzz ee c ( ) b ( ) c ( ) b ( ) g + ≤ + + τ + + τ ⋅+ ⋅+ ⋅+ ⋅ −  (6) 
 




tH t H t H t e t t tL t L t H t e t t v( x , z, e, , ) v( x, z, e, , ) ττ≥ ττ.   (7) 
 
Note again, that bLt, bHt, influenced by the income tax and by τet,τt, enter welfare W of 
future generations.
11 We find the surprising result that this effect plays no role for the 
desirability of τet,τt. Let S
d(τet,τt) denote the optimum value of the maximization of (5), 
subject to (6) and (7), and μ
d the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the self-selection 
constraint (7): 
 
Theorem 2: In a dynamic model, the welfare effect of a marginal increase of τet and τt, 
resp., in some period t, reads:  
                                                  
11   To give a simple example for W: assume that all later generations consist of the two types of individuals 
with ability level ωLs, ωHs and in each period all bequests left by type L (H) go to type L (H) of the next 
generation (eis = bis–1). We define W(bLt,bHt) as the maximum (discounted) future welfare, from t+1 




Lt Ht is s
x, z
st1 iL , H




≡+ γ ⋅ ∑∑ ,  
subject to the resource and the self-selection constraints (6) and (7), for every period s = t+1,…,∞. Note 
that bequests bit = eit+1 of generation t enter
i

























Hence, as in the static model, both taxes increase welfare, if the inheritance received by 
the high-able individual is larger than that received by the low-able. 
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Thus, the dynamic character does not change anything regarding the desirability of a tax on 
inherited wealth or on full expenditures (i.e. on consumption plus bequests). Though the tax 
on inherited wealth (or full expenditure) affects (negatively) the amount of bequests left to 
the next generation, the same condition as in the static case applies, contrary to the 
intuition. The reason is the simultaneous adaptation of the optimum non-linear income tax, 
as can be seen from an inspection of the proof of Theorem 2. Indeed, an increase in τet or τt 
allows an increase in net income from labor which can, for each individual, be designed in 
such a way that all other welfare consequences of the increase of τet (or τt), in particular, the 
consequences for the subsequent generations via bequests, cancel out, except the one 
appearing in Theorem 2(a). The latter effect, which operates via a change of the self-
selection constraint, is positive, if the high-able individual also has a higher wealth 
endowment, as discussed earlier.  
 
This result may be interpreted as a rationale for the common idea that inheritance taxation 
serves the target of equality of opportunity. Its proponents implicitly assume that the group 
with the higher earning abilities also has higher inherited wealth. In the political decision it 
is also frequently taken as granted that taxation of bequests via an estate tax is an   17
appropriate instrument for redistribution. However, when considered alone, an estate tax 
leads to a distortion of the bequest decision
12, which is avoided if all expenditures, that is, 
consumption plus bequests, are taxed at a uniform rate.  
 
A specifically interesting aspect of this cancelling out of all other welfare effects is that 
obviously the value of the social discount rate γ – the weight of future generations – plays 
no direct role for the desirability of τet or τt (it influences the magnitude of the Lagrange 
multiplier μ
d). Moreover, as mentioned in the Introduction, our result shows that the well-
known "double-counting" of bequests, which usually in joy-of-giving models causes a 
counter effect against the introduction of an estate or inheritance tax (and in fact calls for a 
subsidy), can be ignored as well. The point is again that in an appropriate formulation it is 
not the specific use of the budget for leaving a bequest which is taxed, but the initial 
wealth.  
 
Repercussions on the previous generation 
It must be added that up to now we have considered inherited wealth of generation t as 
exogenously given. That is, we have assumed that, when the inheritance and/or full 
expenditure tax is increased or introduced in period t, the bequest decisions of the parent 
generation t −1 are already made. Then Theorem 2 describes the effect of these taxes, and 
obviously the same logic applies, if in period t+1 the taxes τet+1 and/or τt+1 are introduced, 
unexpected by the previous generation t. 
 
                                                  
12   See Brunner (1997) who showed that a specific tax on bequests is desirable, if the social welfare function 
favors redistribution strongly enough to outweigh the distorting consequences.    18
As a final step of our analysis in this Section, we now ask whether something changes, if 
the tax authority increases or introduces the inheritance or full expenditure tax in some 
period t not only for that generation t but also for the subsequent generation t+1, and this is 
anticipated by the individuals in t. How does this affect the bequest behavior of the latter 
and what are the welfare consequences of the taxes in this case? 
 
The answer to this question follows from the bequest motive in our model: bequests are 
regarded as some form of consumption, it is the amount left to the descendant, which per-se 
provides utility to the bequeathing individual. Thus, concerning the full expenditure tax, we 
can state, as a first result, that the introduction (or increase) of τt+1, announced already in 
period t, does not change anything with the above analysis. The formula of Theorem 2(b), 
which describes the effect of τt, applies – with index t+1 – in just the same way for the 
effect of τt+1. The reason is that the full expenditure tax in period t+1 does, by definition, 
not change the value of the bequest bit for the bequeathing individual i of generation t, and 
does, therefore, not influence her bequest decision.  
 
But the situation may be different when it comes to the direct tax on inherited wealth. 
Taking the bequest-as-consumption model literally, one might again argue that the 
anticipation of τet+1 by generation t does not change anything with the formula of Theorem 
2(a), because individuals simply care for what they leave as (gross) bequests to their 
descendants. On the other hand, however, it seems reasonable to model the bequeathing 
generation t as caring for net bequests, then 
net
it it et 1 b b( 1 ) + ≡− τ , instead of gross bequests 
it b
13 appears in her utility function. Such a formulation means that bequeathing individuals 
                                                  
13  Note that we use the expression "gross bequests" for bit from the viewpoint of the receiving generation 
t+1, i.e. only in reference to the inheritance tax τet+1. For the bequeathing generation, however, bit is pre-
tax concerning the full expenditure tax τt.   19
only pay attention to the amount going directly to the descendants; they ignore the revenues 
raised by τet+1 (notice that these run into the public budget of the descendants’ generation 
and reduce their income tax burden).  
 
With this formulation, the introduction (or increase) of an inheritance tax τet+1 causes a 
negative effect on the bequest decision of the previous generation t, which has not been 
considered so far. To analyze this effect, we extend the problem (5) – (7) by adding τet+1 as 
an argument of 
i
t v , it c  and  it b . Moreover, in order to see the consequences in detail, we add 
welfare of generation t+1 explicitly in the social objective and assume that the general 
welfare function  Lt 1 Ht 1 W(b (),b ()) ++ ⋅⋅  describes (discounted) social welfare from generation 
t+2 onward. Thus, the objective function for any given tax rates  e t t e t1 t1 ,, , ++ τ ττ τ  reads 
(instead of (5)): 
 
 
it it 1 it it 1
i1 i 2
i t t i t1 t1 L t1 H t1
x, x , z, z iL , H iL , H





⋅+ + γ ⋅+ + γ ∑ ∑ . (8) 
Further, a resource and a self-selection constraint for period t+1 have to be added (see 
(A13) – (A16) in the Appendix). 
 
Obviously, bequests left by generation t (and influenced by τet+1) represent inheritances of 
generation t+1; we still need not specify the rule guiding the transfer. Let 
d
e t t e t1 t1 S( , , , ) ++ ττ τ τ   denote the optimum value function of the extended problem and 
dd
tt 1 , + μμ , 
d
t1 + λ   the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the self-selection constraints (in 
periods t and t+1) and to the resource constraint in t+1, resp. We find by differentiation and 
manipulation of the Lagrangian function:  
   20
Theorem 3: In a dynamic model, where individuals care for net bequests, the welfare effect 
of a marginal increase of τet+1 and τt+1, resp., announced in period t already, reads:  
iH H d
net d net net t ttt
it it t Ht Ht 2
iL , H et 1 it Ht Lt et 1
H
dd it 1 t 1 Ht 1 Lt 1
t1 t1 H t1 L t1 e t1
iL , H et 1 Lt 1 et 1 et 1
1v v v [ L ] S
(a) [ f b (b b [L] )]
xx x (1 )
ev [ L ] e e




++ + + +
= ++ + +
+τ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=− − μ −+
∂τ ∂ ∂ ∂ −τ
∂∂ ∂ ∂
+λ +μ − − −τ −








d t1 e t1
t1 H t1 L t1
t1 L t1 t1
v[ L ] 1 S











Proof: see Appendix. 
 
It turns out that the condition, which is decisive for the inheritance tax is more complex in 
this case. Still, the remarkable property that all welfare effects for later generations cancel 
out, arises in this context as well: on the right-hand side of Theorem 3(a) effects on 
generations t+2 and later do not appear. 
 
The expression in the first square brackets in (a) shows us how the bequeathing generation t 
is affected. As can be seen from the first term (it is, by Roy's Lemma equivalent to 
i
it t et 1 fv / + ∂∂ τ), the increase of a tax τet+1 on inherited wealth in period t+1 has a direct 
negative effect on welfare of the parent generation, which anticipates the tax. This is a 
result of double-counting in the social welfare function: in the present model the inheritance 
tax diminishes welfare of two generations, viz. t and t+1, while the revenues from the tax 
and their redistribution to the individuals have a positive impact only on generation t+1. 
The second term (multiplier 
d
t μ  ) shows that the increase of τet+1 also affects the self-  21
selection constraint of generation t; its sign is undetermined for arbitrary preferences
14. 
(Clearly, τet+1 does not change the available resources in period t, therefore the resource 
constraint of this period is unaffected.) 
 
The remaining expressions on the right-hand side of Theorem 3(a) describe the welfare 
consequences of τet+1 on the descendant generation t+1. It is decomposed into two effects: 
the first (multiplier 
d
t1 + λ  ) refers to the effect via the resource constraint in period t+1, as 
individuals of the parent generation t will adapt the amount of gross bequests left to their 
descendants. Resources of generation t+1 may increase or decrease, depending on the 
elasticity of net bequests 
net
it 1 it 1 et b b( 1 ) −− =− τ . In case of an elasticity of 1, as with Cobb-
Douglas preferences over cit and 
net
it b  (and separability with respect to labor time), gross 
bequests remain unchanged and the effect on the resource constraint is zero, as in the "no-
anticipation"-case. The second effect (multiplier 
d
t1 + μ  ) is familiar from the earlier 
Theorems, now augmented by the influence of τet+1 on the difference between inheritances 
of high- and low-able individuals in period t+1. Obviously, the condition that inheritances 
increase with abilities now guarantees positivity of this effect only if it is not outweighed 




Altogether, we find that the welfare effect of an increase of the inheritance tax τet+1 is 
diminished, if this increase is anticipated by the previous generation t and individuals care 
for net instead of gross bequests. A direct negative effect on the parent generation occurs, 
as a consequence of the fact that bequests (and, hence, their reduction through the 
                                                  
14   For instance, for quasilinear preferences (introduced in Section 3) the sign is negative, because the 
marginal utility of net income is constant and net bequests are a normal good, i.e. 
net net
Ht Ht b b[ L ] > . 
15  Given that the rule guiding how gross bequests are allocated to generation t+1 does not depend on τet+1. 
Then unchanged gross bequests bLt and bHt mean unchanged gross inheritances eLt+1 and eHt+1.   22
inheritance tax) appear twice in the social welfare function, while the repayment of the tax 
revenues (the reduction of the income tax) occurs only once.  
 
Theorem 3(b) states that, as already discussed above, anticipation does in no way change 
the condition which is decisive for the desirability of the full expenditure tax τt+1. Let us 
finally mention an obvious implication of the bequest-as-consumption motive: taxes 
introduced in some period never have repercussions on generations living more than one 
period earlier, even if individuals care for net bequests.  
 
3. Taxation of inheritances in a stochastic framework 
As already mentioned, an objection against the models of Section 2 could be that with a 
fixed one-to-one relation between abilities and inherited wealth it is possible to identify 
individuals by their inherited wealth or by their expenditures (given these are observable) 
and to impose a first-best tax. In reality, no tax authority follows this strategy, because the 
relation between inherited wealth (or expenditures) and skills is not fixed, but stochastic. In 
order to capture this issue, we now assume that inherited wealth is random and prove a 
stochastic version of Theorem 2, where still a positive relation between inherited wealth 
and abilities is decisive. Furthermore, we offer a theoretical argument for the plausibility of 
such a relation: it results as the outcome of a stochastic process of abilities, if a mild 
condition on the probabilities relating the possible realizations of the child's ability to the 
parent's ability holds.  
 
In order to make the model tractable, we assume in this Section that the utility function 
(identical for all individuals) is quasilinear, i.e., u(c,b,l) (c,b) (l) = ϕ+ ψ , where 
2 : ϕ→ \\  is concave and linear-homogeneous with  /c 0 , /b 0 ∂ϕ∂> ∂ ϕ∂> , and   23
: ψ→ \\  is strictly concave with  '0 ψ < . One observes immediately that for quasilinear 
utility the following statements hold for indirect utility and demand:
16 
 
(q1)  v/ x /( 1 ). ∂∂ = ρ+ τ   ρ is a constant for any ability ω and any x, z. 
e v/ e ( 1 )/( 1 ). ∂∂ = ρ − τ + τ  
(q2)  b/z c /z 0 . ∂∂ = ∂∂ = Demand is independent of gross income and labor time. 
(q3)  ce c( x ( 1 ) e ) / ( 1 ) =α + −τ +τ  and  be b (x (1 )e) /(1 ) = α+ − τ + τ .  cb , αα  are the 
constant shares of consumption and bequests in the available budget, after 
correcting for τ, with αc+αb  =  1. For later use, we define  b /(1 ) α≡α +τ  , 
be ˆ (1 ) /(1 ) α≡α −τ +τ . 
 
The most important consequence of (q1) is that the self-selection constraint is independent 
of income effects, that is, of inheritances (see (11) later on). 
 
We generalize the model by introducing n (not just two) different types of individuals, 
characterized by their earning abilities ωit > 0, i = 1,…,n, with ωit < ωi+1t in period t.  
 
3.1. A stochastic relation between ability levels and inheritances 
Let some tax rates τet, τt (possibly zero) be given in period t. At the beginning of this period 
the planning tax authority determines the optimum tax on labor income (that is, the 
optimum bundles xit, zit, i = 1, ..., n) and decides whether a change of the tax rates τet, τt (or 
their introduction) is desirable.  
                                                  
16  For simplicity we drop the indices referring to the types and periods, because the statements hold for 
individuals of any ability level ω in any period.   24
 
When making the decision, the planner knows the ability levels ω1t, …, ωnt of the 
individuals of generation t period, but cannot identify individuals. Moreover, we assume 
that the planner knows the aggregate amount of bequests, 
agg
t e , left to the generation t in 
total (no uncertainty on aggregate resources in period t exists). There is, however, only a 
stochastic relation between the ability level and the amount of inheritance an individual 
receives. Thus, the planner cannot, even when the realization of inheritances is known, infer 
the ability type of the receiving individual. (Nor is identification possible from the 
expenditures of an individual.)  
 
More formally, we assume that there exists a (finite) number k of ways of how the 
aggregate amount 
agg
t e  may be distributed to the individuals of generation t, where each 
specific allocation j, j = 1,…k, occurs with probability  jt κ  (with  1t kt ... 1) κ ++ κ= and 
transfers 
j
it e  to individual i, with 
jj a g g
1t nt t e ... e e ++ = . The possible realizations and their 
probabilities are known.  
 
Facing uncertainty, the planner wants to maximize expected social welfare in period t. With 
f1t > f2t >...> fnt > 0 being the weights of the different types in the social objective
17, the 






ij 1 j j
it t it it it et t jt 1t nt jt
x, z j1 i1 j1
max ( f v (x ,z ,e , , )) (1 ) W(b ,...,b ) ,
−
== =
τ τκ + + γ κ ∑∑ ∑  (9) 
 s.t. 
n n kn kn
jj j
it it et it jt t it it jt t
i1 i1 j1 i1 j1 i1
xz ( e ) ( ( c b ) ) g ,
== = = = =
≤+ τ κ + τ + κ − ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑  (10) 
                                                  
17   Note that with quasilinear preferences the marginal utility of income is identical for all individuals; 
therefore a utilitarian objective with equal weights would not imply downward redistribution of income.   25









−≥ ψ − ψ
+τ ω ω




it it c, b denote consumption of individual i and bequests left by her, in case that 
allocation j of inheritances is realized. Moreover, similar to the formulation in Subsection 
2.2, W describes how future social welfare is influenced by the bequests of generation t. 
We have assumed that only the self-selection constraints (11) for the respective higher-able 
individuals are relevant in the optimum.
18 This is justified, if the social objective implies 
downward redistribution, which follows from our assumption fit > fi+1t. 
 
We have to check, whether this problem is well defined, that is, whether it can be solved by 
the planner without knowing the actual realization of the inheritances. For this, the 
constraints (10) and (11) must be independent of the actual realization. As the 
j
it e  do not 
appear in the self-selection constraints (11) (due to the consequence (q1) of quasilinear 
utility, as already mentioned), the required independence is clearly fulfilled for these 
constraints. Moreover, exchanging the order of summation in the resource constraint (10) 





it it et t it et t t
i1 i1 i1 t
xz e [ x ( 1 ) e ] g .
1 == =
τ
≤+ τ + + − τ −
+τ ∑∑ ∑  (10') 
 
Thus, the resource constraint is independent of the particular realization of the inheritances 
as well. Only the aggregate amount of inheritances matters, which we assume to be known. 
This proves 
 
                                                  
18   It is well-known that only the self-selection constraints of pairs of individuals with adjacent ability levels 
need to be considered.    26
Lemma 2: The optimum bundles (xit, zit), i = 1, ..., n of problem (9) – (11) can be 
determined independently of the particular realization of individual inheritances 
j
it e .  
 
To derive the following theorem, we need the assumption that W has some "quasilinear 
property", namely that, given any i, the derivatives 
j
it W/ b ∂ ∂  are independent of j. In other 
words, the marginal welfare effect of an increase of an individual's bequests on the welfare 
of future generations is constant and is, in particular independent of the specific realization 
of inheritances received by generation t. This is obviously fulfilled, if W is a discounted 
sum of future expected social welfare (see footnote 11), with quasilinear individual utility 
in each period.  
 
Let now S
r(τet,τt) be the optimum value of (9) subject to (10) and (11), for given τet, τt, and 
let  it e  denote the expected value of the inheritances 
j
it e  which individual i of generation t 
receives. As the criteria for a change (or the introduction) of taxes on inheritances and/or 
full expenditures we find 
 
Theorem 4: With stochastic inheritances, the welfare effect of a marginal increase of τet 


























∂τ +τ ∑ . 
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
   27
Thus, we arrive at a direct stochastic analogon of Theorem 2, referring to expected values 
instead of deterministic inheritances. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the 
desirability of a tax on inheritances (or on full expenditures) is that the order of expected 
inheritances is the same as the order of earning abilities, because then the right-hand sides 
of (a) and (b) are positive.
19 
 
3.2. An intertemporal model with stochastic transition of abilities 
In this Subsection we provide a theoretical argument for the plausibility of the sufficient 
condition of Theorem 4. We do so by studying a stochastic process which determines how 
the relation between abilities and inherited wealth evolves over time. The essential elements 
of the process we consider are the following: 
 
(P1) In each period t there exists the same number n of individuals with identical 
quasilinear utility, as introduced at the beginning of Section 3. They differ in their 
earning abilities, with order 0 < ω1t < ω2t < … < ωnt.
20 
(P2)  Each individual has a single descendant to whom she leaves all her bequests. 
(P3) The order of ability levels of the descendants can be any permutation of the order 
of the parent individuals' abilities.  
(P4) In each period t the identical permutation, where each individual's ability is ranked 
just as her parent's ability (in period t – 1), has a higher probability pEt than any 
                                                  
19   One can show that a sufficient and necessary condition for the desirability of these taxes is that the social 
marginal valuation of individual i's income (including its value for all future generations via bequests), 
i.e., 
1
it b it t [f (1 ) W/ b ]/(1 )
− ρ+ +γ α ∂ ∂ +τ ), is negatively correlated with expected inheritance  it e . This 
result is obtained by solving (A22) – (A24) in the Appendix for 
r
i μ  and using this expression together with 
the definition of the covariance in the RHS's of (a) and (b). 
20   Thus, we allow any change of the ability levels, e.g., they could grow by some common growth rate.   28
other permutation. All other permutations occur with the same probability pt, with 
tE t (n! 1)p 1 p −= − . 
 
(P1) – (P4) seem to be reasonable properties. In particular – as mentioned in footnote 6 – 
there is much empirical evidence indicating a positive correlation between children's and 
parents' earning abilities, which we capture by property (P4).
21 Note that the process has the 
well-known property of “regression to the mean” in the following sense: if we consider a 
parent with ability rank i in the upper half (i > (n + 1)/2), then the descendant’s ability has a 
higher probability to rank below i than above i.
22 An analogous relation holds for a parent 
with ability rank i < (n +1)/2.  
 
In addition, we assume that in each period t a tax system exists, consisting of taxes on labor 
income, inheritance and full expenditure (all possibly zero). Individuals earn gross income 
zit and net income xit and choose cit, bit.  
 
Generally, the transfer of wealth over generations and the stochastic nature of how abilities 
are linked to inheritances in each generation generate a very complex process, whose 
properties are difficult to analyze. The reason is that in each period the amount which an 
individual receives as inheritance depends on the combination of ability level and 
inheritance that characterized her parent, and the inheritance of the latter in turn depended 
on the combination characterizing the grandparent and so on. Thus, the number of possible 
combinations grows rapidly over time. 
                                                  
21   An alternative way would be to assume that the probability of a descendant's ability level having the same 
rank as the parent's is higher than the probability of having any other rank. This would imply our 
assumption of a higher probability of the identical permutation. 
22  As for the descendant any rank j ≠ i has the same probability (n – 1)!pt, the probability that her rank is 
lower than i is (i – 1)(n – 1)!pt for her, while that of a higher rank is (n – i)(n – 1)!pt. i > (n + 1)/2 implies 
i – 1 > n – i. See also the proof of Lemma 3 below.   29
 
The key observation, which allows us to derive a clear-cut result on the long-run stochastic 
properties of the distribution of inherited wealth and earning abilities, as introduced above, 
is the following: assume that in some starting period 0 there is no initial wealth. With 
quasilinear preferences, each individual with ability level ωi0 leaves bequests  i0 0 i0 b x =α   
(remember property (q3) at the beginning of Section 3; we add a period index to indicate 
that  t α   depends on the tax rate of the respective period) to her descendant with some 
ability level ωj1. The latter in turn, for whom  i0 e1 j1 e1 b (1 ) e (1 ) −τ= − τ is part of the budget, 
bequeaths an amount  1i 0 1 0i 0 ˆˆ b x α =αα   out of bi0 to her descendant
23 (with some ability level 
ωm1), who again leaves  210i 0 ˆˆ x ααα   out of it, and so on.
24 
 
That is, each net income xi0 initiates an own series of bequests, which can, given quasilinear 
utility, be described by a simple formula. Obviously, this observation can be generalized to 
later periods: out of the net incomes xit of that period, each generation t initiates a new 
series, which we call a bequest series, denoted by βt. βt consists of the elements 
s
it β , where i 
indicates the ability level of the first bequeathing individual and s denotes the receiving 
generation, thus 
t1
it t it x
+ β= α   and 
s1 s
it s it ˆ + β =αβ  for s ≥ t+1. One finds immediately that each 
bequest series vanishes in the course of time, as all  t ˆ 1 α < . Note also that the ability levels 
of the receiving individuals of any generation t' > t do not influence the value of subsequent 
s
it β , s > t'. 
 
                                                  
23   In addition, of course, the individual of type ωj1 also bequeaths  1j 1 x α   out of her own net income. 
24   Here we have assumed that bequeathing individuals care for gross bequests bit. If they anticipate the next 
period's inheritance tax and care for net bequests bit(1 – τet+1), the respective definitions of  t α   and  t ˆ α  
continue to hold, but with a different value of the parameter  b α , which now depends on the inheritance 
tax τet+1 of the next period.   30
From the perspective of a receiving individual in some period s, her inheritance is the sum 
of what she receives through all bequest series βt initiated by earlier generations. We first 




ij t P( ) β  denote the probability that individual i in period s receives the bequest initiated 
by individual j in period t < s. The following relations between the probabilities 
characterizing the distribution of inheritances are derived from the properties (P1) - (P4): 
 
Lemma 3: For any i,j = 1,…,n, i ≠ j, and any s > t, the inequalities  
 (a)   
ss
ii t ij t P( ) P( ) β> β, 
 (b)   
ss 1
ii t ii t P( ) P( )
+ β> β , 
ss 1
ij t ij t P( ) P( )
+ β<β , 
 are  fulfilled. 
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
In any later period, an individual has a higher probability of receiving the bequests left 
initially by a parent with identical ability rank than of receiving the bequests of any other 
parent. However, (b) tells us that the difference between these probabilities becomes 
smaller with any further transition. That is, in the course of time, the elements of a bequest 
series become more equally distributed within a generation of heirs. On the other hand, this 
equalization occurs for lower and lower values of the transfers in a bequest series, as each 
series  t β  diminishes with  s ˆ 1 α<. What dominates the inheritances received by some 
generation are the bequest series initiated by rather recent generations, which are more 
unequally distributed.  
   31
A consequence of the properties of the wealth transfer as described above is that for any 
bequest series the order of expected values of inheritances coincides with the order of 
ability levels, if in the initial period net incomes rise with abilities. Let 
s
it E[ ] β  denote the 
expected value of the inheritance received by an individual with ability ωis in period s > t 
from the bequest series  t β . 
 
Lemma 4: Assume that  it i 1t xx + < . Then for any s  >  t and any bequest series  t β , 
ss
it i 1t E[ ] E [ ] + β < β  for all i 1,...,n 1. =−  
ss
it i 1t E[ ] E [ ] + β ≤ β  holds if  it i 1t xx + ≤ . 
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Note that the condition  it i 1t xx + ≤  is always fulfilled, if preferences have the property AM 
(see Subsection 2.1).  it i 1t xx + =
25 may occur, if the income tax function is not smooth. 
 
As the inheritances received by the individuals of some generation s are the sum of what 
they get out of all the bequest series  t β  initiated by earlier generations, we arrive at the 
desired relation between expected inheritances  is e  and ability levels ωis: 
 
Theorem 5: Assume that in period 0 there is no initial wealth and  it i 1t xx + <  for at least one 
t < s. Then  is i 1s ee + < . 
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
                                                  
25   This possibility is called "bunching" in the literature on optimum income taxation, see, e.g. Guesnerie and 
Seade (1982) or Brunner (1989) for a finite economy.   32
Theorem 5 allows us to formulate a definite result on the desirability of an inheritance 
and/or full expenditure tax in our model. We consider an economy developing according to 
the stochastic process described by (P1) – (P4), where in each period a tax system may 
exist. Then, in some period s, the planner chooses an optimum nonlinear income tax and 
thinks of a change of the tax rates τes, τs. She aims at maximizing present and (discounted) 
future welfare and knows the aggregate amount of inheritances received by generation s, 
and its possible allocations. Given that the downward self-selection constraints are binding, 
(9) – (11) is the relevant optimization problem and we find:  
 
Theorem 6: Assume that in period 0 there is no initial wealth and  it i 1t xx + <  for at least one 
t < s and one i ∈ {1,…, n −1}. Then in period s an increase of the taxes on inheritance 
and/or on full expenditures, combined with an optimum nonlinear income, increases 
social welfare. 
 
Proof: Combine Theorems 4 and 5. 
 
A shift from income taxation to inheritance (or full expenditure) taxation allows further 
redistribution, except the extreme case that in all prior periods the income tax is designed in 
such a way that all individuals choose the same gross (and net) income.
26 Note further that 
Theorem 6, as far as the inheritance tax is concerned, rests on the assumption that decisions 
of the prior generation are already made, when the increase of τet is announced (compare 
the discussion of Theorem 3). 
 
                                                  
26   This extreme situation does not occur, if in some period t < s an optimum nonlinear income tax is 
imposed, because, as is well known, the latter requires "no bunching at the top". See Guesnerie and Seade 
(1982), Brunner (1989).   33
4. Conclusion 
Bequests create wealth differences within the generation of heirs. Drawing on this 
observation, which is central to the equality-of-opportunity argument, we have clarified the 
role of inheritance taxation in an optimum-taxation framework with a bequest-as-
consumption motive. In particular, we have worked out how different generations are 
affected by this tax. More generally, our results shed new light on the role of indirect taxes 
as well as of a tax on inherited wealth in combination with an optimum nonlinear income 
tax. The two main messages are the following:  
 
First, in a static setting it is desirable, according to a utilitarian social objective, to shift 
some tax burden from labor income to initial wealth, if initial wealth increases with earning 
abilities. From a theoretical point of view, this result is a consequence of the information 
constraint which motivates income taxation in the Mirrlees-model: if the tax authority could 
observe individual earning abilities, it would impose the tax directly on these, as a 
(differentiated) first-best instrument. Given that this is impossible, it seems natural, then, 
that the authority can improve the tax system by use of information (i.e. imposing a tax) on 
inherited wealth (in addition to information on income), in case that it is observable and 
correlated with abilities. (In fact, if the correlation were negative, wealth should be 
subsidized.) Equivalently, a uniform tax on consumption plus bequests is also appropriate 
for this purpose.  
 
Secondly, this result remains unchanged in a dynamic model in which the social welfare 
function accounts for effects on future generations: these effects cancel out when the 
optimum labor income tax is adapted accordingly. This is the final result for the case that a 
uniform tax on consumption plus bequests is imposed, as a surrogate for a tax on inherited   34
wealth. In case that inheritances are taxed directly, an additional effect hast to be observed: 
if the parent individuals care for net instead of gross bequests (and anticipate the tax falling 
on the recipients of the wealth transfer in the next generation), then the bequest decision of 
the previous generation is affected and a further welfare effect arises, which is negative, 
because of "double-counting" of bequests.  
 
Obviously, for the second message the assumption of the joy-of-giving motive for leaving 
bequests is important. With this motive, individuals care for the amount they leave to their 
descendants (and possibly for its reduction through an inheritance tax). However, they do 
not care for which purpose the descendants use their inheritance, nor, in particular, to which 
extent the descendants are subjected to a tax when they use the inherited amount for own 
consumption as well as for bequests in favor of a further generation. This is a reasonable 
standard assumption; it implies that a uniform tax on consumption and bequests produces 
no negative effects for the parent generation.  
 
Finally, we have demonstrated that the results on the taxation of inheritances remain 
essentially valid, if there is a stochastic instead of a deterministic connection between 
abilities and inheritances: taxation is desirable, if expected inheritances of more able 
individuals are larger. Moreover, such a situation was shown to arise as the outcome of a 
stochastic process in which the descendants’ ability ranks are more likely to be the same as 
their parents’ ranks than any other.  
 
Throughout this paper we have assumed that earning abilities are exogenous. In reality, of 
course, they depend on human capital investments, which are financed out of the parents’ 
budget, as are inheritances of non-human capital. Given that both increase with the budget,   35
this provides an additional argument for the positive relation between abilities and inherited 
wealth within the generation of heirs.  
 
When investigating the welfare consequences of the taxation of inheritances, we confined 
our analysis to a uniform tax on consumption plus bequests and to a proportional tax on 
inherited wealth, and proved that, in principle, they are equivalent. We did not consider the 
possibility that a differentiation of tax rates according to the type of expenditures might 
increase welfare further, as it does in the Atkinson-Stiglitz model. Moreover, also the 
welfare consequences of other tax schedules, for instance a linear (instead of a nonlinear) 
income tax or a nonlinear tax on inheritances, deserve further analysis.   36
Appendix  
Proof of Theorem 1 
(a)  The Lagrangian to the maximization problem (2) – (4) reads  
 
  () ( ) ()
()
LH
LL L L e HH H H e
LHLH e LH L L H H
HH
HHHe LLHe
Lf v ( x , z , e ,, )f v ( x , z , e ,, )
x x z z e e c ( )b ( )c ( )b ( ) g
v( x, z, e, ,) v( x, z, e, ,)
=τ τ + τ τ −
− λ + − − − τ + − τ ⋅+ ⋅+ ⋅+ ⋅ + +
+μ τ τ − τ τ
 
 
which gives us the first-order condition with respect to xL, xH, i = L,H (we use the 
abbreviation 
HH





































ff ( e e ) ( )
vv [ L ]
() .
∂∂∂∂ ∂∂ ∂
=++ λ + + λ τ + + + +








ei i ve v x ∂∂ τ = − ∂∂ , 
HH
eH L v[ L ] e v[ L ] x ∂ ∂τ = − ∂ ∂ ,  ie i ii ce c x ∂ ∂τ = − ∂ ∂ , 
ie i ii b eb x ∂∂ τ = − ∂∂ , compute 
i
ii fv x ∂ ∂ , i = L,H, from (A1) and (A2) and transform, 
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ff ( c b c b )
cbcb vv [ L ]
() .
∂∂ ∂
= + + λ+++ +
∂τ ∂τ ∂τ
∂∂∂∂ ∂∂
+λτ + + + +μ −μ
∂τ∂ τ∂ τ∂ τ ∂ τ ∂ τ
 (A5) 
 
The individual i's budget equation can be written as  ii i cbB , +=  where 
ii e i B( x( 1 ) e ) ( 1) ≡+ − τ + τ . Thus,  ii i i i i i i c( c B ) ( B ) ( c b ) c x ∂ ∂τ = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂τ = − + ∂ ∂  (use 
2
ii e i i i B( x ( 1 ) e ) ( 1 ) ( c b ) ( 1 ) ∂∂ τ = −+ − τ + τ = −+ + τ ) and  ii ii cx cB / ( 1) ∂ ∂= ∂ ∂ + τ ); 
equivalently  ii i i i b (c b ) b x ∂∂ τ = −+∂∂ . Substituting these terms, together with 
ii
ii i v( c b ) v x ∂∂ τ = −+ ∂∂, 
HH
HH L v [L] (c [L] b [L]) v [L] x ∂∂ τ = −+ ∂∂ (where cH[L], 
bH[L], resp., denotes consumption and bequests of individual H, having L's gross and 






Sv [ L ]
(c [L] b [L]) (c b )
x
∂∂




Inserting the (transformed) budget equations of individual H when mimicking and of 
individual L, i.e.,  HH L e H c [L] b [L] (x (1 )e ) (1 ) + =+ − τ + τ  and  LL cb +=  
Le L (x (1 )e ) (1 ) =+ − τ + τ  into (A6), we obtain the formula of Theorem 1(b).  QED 
 
Proof of Theorem 2 
(a)  From the Lagrangian to the optimization problem (5) – (7) we derive the first-order 
conditions with respect to xLt, xHt, where λ
d, μ
d are the multipliers corresponding to the 




1d d d tL t L t L t t
Lt t
Lt Lt Lt Lt Lt Lt
vb c b v [ L ] W
f( 1 ) ( ) 0 ,
xb x x x x
− ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
++ γ − λ + λ τ + − μ =
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (A7)   38
 
H H
1d d d tH t H t H t t
Ht t
Ht Ht Ht Ht Ht Ht
vb c b v W
f( 1 ) ( ) 0 .
xb x x x x
− ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
++ γ − λ + λ τ + + μ =
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (A8) 
 
The derivative of the optimum-value function S
d with respect  et τ  is found by 




1d tt L t H t
Lt Ht Lt Ht
et et et Lt et Ht et
HH
dd Lt Lt Ht Ht t t
t
et et et et et et
vv b b SW W
ff( 1 ) ( ) ( e e )
bb
cbcb vv [ L ]
() ( ) .
− ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
=++ + γ + + λ + +
∂τ ∂τ ∂τ ∂ ∂τ ∂ ∂τ
∂∂∂∂ ∂∂
+λ τ + + + +μ −
∂τ ∂τ ∂τ ∂τ ∂τ ∂τ
 (A9) 
 




1 tt L t H t
Lt Lt Ht Ht Lt Ht
et Lt Ht Lt Lt Ht Ht
dd Lt Lt Ht Ht
Lt Ht t Lt Ht





vv b b SW W
fe fe ( 1 )(e e )
xx b x b x
cb cb
(e e ) [ e ( ) e ( )]
xx xx
vv [ L ]
e( ) .
xx
− ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
=− − + +γ − − +
∂τ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂∂ ∂∂







Multiplying (A7), (A8) by  Lt e, Ht e , resp., and substituting into (A10) gives us the 
formula of Theorem 2(a). 
 




1 tt L t H t
Lt Ht
ttt L t t H t t
d Lt Lt Ht Ht





vv b b SW W
ff( 1 ) ( )
bb
cbcb
[c b c b ( )]
vv [ L ]
() .
− ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
=++ + γ + +
∂τ ∂τ ∂τ ∂ ∂τ ∂ ∂τ
∂∂∂∂
+ λ ++++ τ + + + +






By use of the formulas below (A5), (A11) can be transformed to 






it it it it it
iL , H ti t i t i t
d it it




Ht Ht Ht Ht
Ht Lt
vb SW
f ( cb ) ( 1) ( ( cb )
xb x
cb
[c b (c b )( ]
xx
vv [ L ]





=−+ − + γ + +
∂τ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂∂
+λ + −τ + + −
∂∂
∂∂











Ht Ht Lt Lt
tL t
v[ L ] S
(c [L] b [L] c b ),
x
∂ ∂




or, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1(b), the formula of Theorem 2(b).  QED 
 
Proof of Theorem 3 
(a)  If individuals care for net bequests, indirect utility of an individual i of generation t 




ti ti ti te tte t 1
net net
it it it it t it it et 1 it et it
v( x, z, e, , , )




ω +τ + −τ ≤ + −τ
 
 
Obviously, consumption  it c( ) ⋅ , net bequests 
net
it b () ⋅  and gross bequests 
net
it it et 1 b () b ()/( 1 ) + ⋅= ⋅ − τ  depend on the same arguments as 
i
t v() ⋅ . Moreover, gross 
inheritances  it 1 e( ) + ⋅  are endogenous, they result from bequests of generation t via some 
(unspecified) rule and depend on the same arguments as  Lt b () ⋅  and  Ht b () ⋅ .  
 
When determining taxes for the periods t and t+1, the tax authority has to observe the 
resource and the self-selection constraints for these periods: 
   40
 
net
it it et it t it it et 1 t
iL , H iL , H
x[ z e ( c ( ) b ( ) / ( 1 ) ) ] g +
==
≤+ τ + τ ⋅ + ⋅ − τ − ∑∑ , (A13) 
 
net
i t1 i t1 e t1i t1 t1 i t1 t1 e t2 t1
iL , H iL , H
x[ z e ( ) ( c ( ) b ( ) / ( 1 ) ) ] g ++ + + + + + + +
==
≤+ τ ⋅ + τ ⋅ + ⋅ − τ − ∑∑ , (A14) 
 
HH
t H tH tH te tte t 1 t L tL tH te tte t 1 v( x , z, e, , , ) v( x, z, e, , , ) ++ ττ τ ≥ ττ τ , (A15) 
 
H
t1 H t1 H t1 H t1 e t1 t1 e t2
H
t1 L t1 L t1 H t1 e t1 t1 e t2
v ( x, z, e( ) , ,, )
v( x , z , e ( ) , , , ) .
++++ + + +
++++ + + +




Using the Envelope Theorem we get for the optimum value function 
d
e t t e t1 t1 S( , , , ) ++ ττ τ τ   of the maximization problem (8), (A13) – (A16) (
d
t λ  , 
d
t1 + λ  , 
d
t μ  , 
d




12 tt 1 i t 1
it it 1
iL , H i i et 1 et 1 et 1 it 1 et 1
net net
d it it it
tt 2
i et 1 et 1 et 1 et 1
dd it 1
t1 i t1 e t1 t1t1
i et 1
vv b SW









= ++ + + +
++ + +
+
++ + + +
+
∂∂ ∂ ∂∂
=+ + γ + + γ +
∂τ ∂τ ∂τ ∂ ∂τ
∂∂
+λ τ + + +
∂τ −τ ∂τ −τ
∂∂









it 1 it 1
i et 1 et 2 et 1
HH H H
dd tt t 1 t 1
tt 1




vv [ L ] vv [ L ]










+μ − +μ −





Differentiating the individual budget constraint of an individual i with respect to  et 1 + τ  






et 1 et 1 et 1 et 1
cb b 1
0
(1 ) (1 ) ++ + +
∂∂
++ =
∂τ −τ ∂τ −τ
. (A18) 
 
For shorter notation we introduce net inheritances 
net
it 1 it 1 et 1 e( ) e( ) ( 1 ) + ++ ⋅≡ ⋅ − τ , with 
net
it 1 et 1 it 1 et 1 it 1 et 1 e/ e ( 1 ) e/ ++ + + ++ ∂∂ τ = − + − τ ∂∂ τ , thus 
net
it 1 et 1 it 1 et 1 it 1 e/ e/ e ++ ++ + ∂ ∂τ −∂ ∂τ = + 
et 1 it 1 et 1 e/ ++ + +τ ∂ ∂τ . Further, we have: 
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()
in e t 2 i
te t 1 t i t e t 1 ti t v/ ( 1 ) b / ( 1 ) v/x ++ ∂∂ τ= −+ τ − τ ∂∂  (use Roy's Lemma), 
in e t i
t 1 et 1 it 1 et 1 t 1 it 1 v / (e / ) (v /x ) ++ ++++ ∂∂ τ = ∂∂ τ∂∂, 
net
it 1 et 1 it 1 et 1 it 1 it 1 c / (e / ) (c /x ) + ++ + + + ∂∂ τ = ∂∂ τ ∂∂, 
net net net
i t 1e t 1 i t 1e t 1 i t 1i t 1 b /( e / ) ( b / x ) ++ ++++ ∂∂ τ = ∂∂ τ ∂∂, 
net
it 1 it 1 it 1 it 1 et 2 b /x (b /x ) / ( 1 ) ++ ++ + ∂∂ = ∂∂ − τ . 
 
By use of these formulas and of (A18), (A17) can be transformed to 
 
 
ii n e t d
net 1 tt t 1 i t 1
it it it 1 2
et 1 it it 1 et 1 iL , H i et 1
net net
2d it 1 it 1 it 1 it 1
t1




1v v e S
fb ( 1 ) f
xx (1 )
be e e W







++ + = +






+τ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=− + + γ +
∂τ ∂ ∂ ∂τ −τ
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
++ γ + λ − +










dn e t it 1 it 1 t t
tH t 2
1i t 1 e t 1 H t i et 1
HH H n e t
net d tt 1 t 1 H t 1
Ht t 1




v[ L ] v v [ L ] e







∂∂ + τ ∂
+ +μ − +
∂∂ τ ∂ −τ
∂∂ ∂ ∂
++ μ −
∂∂ ∂ ∂ τ
∑ 

   (A19) 
 
Finally, we derive the first-order conditions from the Lagrangian to the maximization 
problem (8) and (A13) – (A16) with respect to xLt+1, xHt+1  (we use again that 
net




12 d t1 L t1
Lt 1 t 1
Lt 1 Lt 1 Lt 1
H
dd Lt 1 Lt 1 t 1
t1t1 t1
Lt 1 Lt 1 Lt 1
vb W
(1 ) f (1 )
xb x










+γ + +γ −λ +
∂∂ ∂
∂∂ ∂







12 d t1 H t1
Ht 1 t 1
Ht 1 Ht 1 Ht 1
H
dd Ht 1 Ht 1 t
t1t1 t1
Ht 1 Ht 1 Ht
vb W












+γ + +γ −λ +
∂∂ ∂
∂∂ ∂






Multiplying (A20) by 
net
Lt 1 et 1 e/ ++ ∂∂ τ  and (A21) by 
net
Ht 1 et 1 e/ + + ∂ ∂τ , resp., and substituting 
into (A19), gives us the formula of Theorem 3(a).  
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(b)   Follows immediately from the fact that indirect utility 
i
t v() ⋅  of an individual i of 
generation t - even if she cares for net bequests - does not depend on τt+1, neither do net 
bequests 
net
it b () ⋅  nor consumption  it c( ) ⋅ .    QED 
 
Proof of Theorem 4 
(a) From the Lagrangian to the problem (9), (10'), (11), we derive the first-order conditions 
for the optimum xit, i = 1,...,n, where 
rr
i ,, λ μ i = 2,...,n, are the multipliers corresponding 
to the resource constraint and the self-selection constraints, respectively (remember 




1r r 1t b t 2
jt j
j1 tt t t 1t
f W
(1 ) 0,
11 1 1 b
−
=
ρα τ μρ ∂
++ γ κ − λ + λ − =
+τ +τ +τ +τ ∂ ∑  (A22) 
 
r k
1r r it b t i
jt j






11 1 1 b





ρα τ μρ ∂
++ γ κ − λ + λ + −








1r r nt b t n
jt j
j1 tt t t nt
f W
(1 ) 0.
11 1 1 b
−
=
ρα τ μρ ∂
++ γ κ − λ + λ + =
+τ +τ +τ +τ ∂ ∑  (A24) 
 
  Next we consider the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to τet: 
 
 
ij r kn kn
1 r agg r agg ti t t
it jt jt t t j
j1i1 j1i1 et et et t it
vb SW





=κ + + γ κ + λ − λ
∂τ ∂τ ∂τ +τ ∂ ∑∑ ∑∑ . (A25) 
 
 Using 
ij j i j
t it et it t it it t v(, e,) / e v/ x e / ( 1 ) ∂⋅ ⋅ ∂ τ = − ∂ ∂= − ρ+ τ  and 
j
it et b/ ∂ ∂τ =
j
it b t e/ ( 1) , −α + τ 




1 r agg r agg bt
it it it t t
i1 i1 et t t it t
SW





=− − +γ +λ −λ
∂τ +τ +τ ∂ +τ ∑∑ . (A26) 
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  Here we have used the property that 
j
it W/ b ∂ ∂  is assumed independent of j, as 
mentioned in the text (we write  it W/ b ∂ ∂ ). Using this property again in (A22) – (A24) 




1r r 1t b t 2
1t 1t 1t 1t 1t
tt 1 t t t
f W
e( 1 ) e e e e ,
11 b 1 1
− ρα τ μρ ∂
−= + γ − λ + λ −




1r r it b t i
it it it it it






e( 1) e e e e
11 b 1 1




ρα τ μρ ∂
−= + γ − λ + λ +−







1r r nt b t n
nt nt nt nt nt
tt n t t t
f W
e( 1 ) e e e e .
11 b 1 1
− ρα τ μρ ∂
−= + γ − λ + λ +
+τ +τ ∂ +τ +τ
 (A29) 
 
  Substituting (A27) – (A29) into (A26) and observing that, by assumption  
 
 
nn k k n
jj a g g
it it jt jt it t
i1 i1j1 j1 i1
ee e e
== = = =
=κ = κ = ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , 
 
  gives us the formula of Theorem 4(a).  
 
(b)  The proof of Theorem 4(b) is analogous.   QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
(a)  The proof is by induction, where we also show: for any s > t, 
s
ii t P( ) β  is the same for all 
i and 
ss
ij t ik t P( ) P( ) β=β for all  j,k i ≠ . Consider the first generation of heirs after the 
beginning of a bequest series (set s = t+1). There are (n – 1)! permutations that have 
the property that  the descendant of an individual with ability rank i has the same rank. 
One of these permutations is the identical, which has probability  Et 1 p + , while the others 




ii t E t 1 t 1 P( ) p [ (n 1 )! 1 ] p
+
+ + β= +− − . (A30) 
 
Analogously, there are (n – 1)! permutations with the property that a descendant with 




ij t t 1 P( ) (n 1 )!p .
+
+ β= −  (A31) 
 




ii t ij t E t 1 t 1 t 1
Et 1 t 1 t 1
P ( ) (n 1)P ( ) p [(n 1)! 1]p (n 1)(n 1)!p








where the latter equality follows from property (P4). The inequality 
t1 t1
ii t ij t P( ) P( )
++ β> β 
is equivalent to  Et 1 t 1 pp 0 ++ −> , which is guaranteed again by (P4). Moreover, from the 
RHS's of (A30) and (A31), resp., it is immediate that 
t1
ii t P( )
+ β  is the same for all i, and 
t1 t1
ij t ik t P( ) P( )
++ β= β for all  j,k i ≠ . 
 
Next, assume that 
ss
ii t ij t P( ) P( ) β> β, 
ss
ii t jj t P( ) P( ) β =β  and 
ss
ij t ik t P( ) P( ) β =β (which 
obviously implies 
ss
ij t ji t P( ) P( ) β=β, ij ≠ ) hold for some arbitrary s. To see that then all 
three relations also hold for s+1, we note that for the transition from generation s to 
s+1, there are two ways for a type-i individual to receive, in period s1 + , the bequest 
left by an identically ranked individual in the initial period t < s: either from the type-i 
individual in period s (who has received the i-bequest with probability 
s
ii t P( ) β ) or from 
some other (type-j) individual in period s (who has received the i-bequest with 
probability 
s




ii t ii t E s 1 s 1 ij t s 1 P( ) P( )[p ((n 1)! 1)p ] (n 1)P( )(n 1)!p .
+
++ + β= β +− − + − β −  (A32) 
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Analogously, the three ways for a type-i individual in period s1 +  to receive the 
bequest left by some type-j individual in period t < s are: either from the type-i 
individual in period s or from the type-j individual in period s or from any other 




ij t ij t E s 1 s 1 ii t s 1
s
ij t s 1
P( ) P( ) [p ( (n 1 )! 1 )p ] P( ) (n 1 )!p












ii t ij t
ss s




i i t E s1 s1 i j t E s1 s1
P( ) (n 1 )P( )
P ( ) p P ( ) p[ ( n1 ) ! 1( n1 ) ( n1 ) ! ]P ( ) p ( n1 )
P( )p (n 1)[(n 1)! (n 1)! 1 (n 2)(n 1)!]






=β +β − − +− − +β − +
+β − −+−− +− −
=β + −+β − + − )],
 
 
which is equal to 1, as  Es 1 s 1 p( n ! 1 ) p 1 ++ +− =  and 
ss
ii t ij t P( ) (n 1 )P( ) 1 β +− β= . 
 
Now, straightforward transformations show that 
s1 s1
ii t ij t P( ) P( )
+ + β> β is equivalent to 
ss
i i t E s1 s1 i j t E s1 s1 P( ) (p p ) P( ) (p p ) ++ ++ β− > β− , which holds, because 
ss
ii t ij t P( ) P( ) β> β and 
Es 1 s 1 pp ++ > . Moreover, 
s1
ii t P( )
+ β  is the same for all i and 
s1
ij t P( )
+ β  is the same for any 
i,j, because the RHS's of (A32) and (A33) are the same for all i,j, resp. This completes 
the proof of (a). 
 
(b)  Note from (A32) that 
s1
ii t P( )
+ β  is a convex combination of 
s
ii t P( ) β  and 
s
ij t P( ) β , because 
the sum of the coefficients of 
s
ii t P( ) β  and 
s
ij t P( ) β  is  
 
  E s1 s1 s1 E s1 s1 p p (n 1 1)(n 1)!p p (n! 1)p 1. ++ + + + −+ − +− = + − =  
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Thus, 
s
ii t P( ) β  > 
s
ij t P( ) β  implies 
ss 1
ii t ii t P( ) P( )
+ β> β . Finally, 
ss 1
ij t ij t P( ) P( )
+ β<β  follows 
from 
ss
ii t ij t P( ) (n 1 )P( ) 1 β+ − β=  and 
s1 s1
ii t ij t P( ) (n 1 )P( ) 1
++ β +− β = . QED 
  
Proof of Lemma 4 
Remember from the main text that a bequest series βt, initiated in t as  it t it b x =α  , leads to 















ii t i t ij t j t i 1i 1 t i 1 t i 1m t m t
ji mi1
P ( )x P ( )x P ( )x P ( )x ++ + +
≠≠ +
βΓ + βΓ < β Γ + β Γ ∑ ∑  
 
and further to (remember from the Proof of Lemma 3 that 
s
ii t P( ) β  is the same for all i = 
1,…,n and that 
ss




i it it i jt i 1t i it i 1t i jt it P( )x P( )x P( )x P( )x ++ β+ β < β + β. 
 
The validity of the latter relation follows from 
ss
ii t ij t P( ) P( ) β >β  and  it i 1t xx + < . By the same 
logic,  it i 1t xx + ≤  implies 
ss
it i 1t E[ ] E [ ] + β ≤ β . QED 
 
Proof of Theorem 5 
The inheritances of an individual i in period s can be written as being the sum of all bequest 





is i t i t
t0 t0
eE [ ] E [ ] .
−−
==
=β =β ∑∑  
 
Therefore, we conclude from Lemma 4: as 
ss
it i 1t E[ ] E [ ] + β ≤ β  due to  it i 1t xx + ≤  for all i = 
1,… n – 1,  is i 1s ee + < , if  it i 1t xx + <  for at least one t < s.  QED   47
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